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Are beliefs knowledge? This is the fundamental question Williamson raises in his assertion that evidence is 
knowledge, or, E = K. This removes the two components of the traditional analysis of knowledge: 
justification and belief. A primary difference between belief and knowledge is that “knowledge entails truth 
while belief does not. There is false belief but no false knowledge” (Knowledge First 208). For Williamson, 
evidence equaling knowledge is similar to the scientific principles—either there is evidence of something or 
there is no evidence of something. If there is no evidence, then there is no knowledge. Williamson develops 
this into his “knowledge first” approach: evidence is what you know. Therefore, knowledge must exist first. 
Beliefs are then derived from this knowledge, rather than belief contributing to knowledge. A famous 
objection is presented by Hawthorne and his look at a gas gauge. 
Hawthorne’s Objection to E = K 
(1) I see a gas gauge that reads "Full." The gauge is accurate, and so I come to know that the gas tank 
is full. 
(2) I see a gas gauge that reads "Full". The gauge is inaccurate, and so (since knowledge is factive) I 
do not come to know that the gas tank is full (Hawthorne 454). 
Hawthorne’s objection is simple: if E=K, the gas gauge is providing different evidence despite measuring the 
same tank of gas. The person reading gas gauge (1) is dealing with a different world then the person reading 
gas gauge (2). There is an asymmetry of evidence: the gas gauges are reading something different while the 
gas tanks are both full. We must conclude that gas gauge (1) is providing evidence while gas gauge (2) is not 
providing evidence.  
Williamson’s Reply to Hawthorne 
Case 1: The world that the observer in world (1) knows, may actually be in world (2). Although the “gauge is 
accurate, that fact is not epistemologically available in the way required for seeing that it reads ‘Full’ to yield 
knowledge that the tank is full” (Williamson 478). With this view, neither observer in either world knows 
the tank is full. Because of this, E=K still stands. 
 Case 2: It is not the case that the observer in world (1) knows he is in world (2). In world (1), the danger of 
an inaccurate fuel gauge is too remote for world (2) to be an epistemic possibility. The observer in world (1) 
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is in better circumstances for epistemic possibility. Therefore, the observer in world (1) has better evidence 
than the observer in world (2). This proves an asymmetry of evidence and asymmetry of knowledge. 
Evidence and knowledge remain symmetrical to one another. There is not knowledge without evidence nor 
evidence without knowledge. Therefore, E=K is still accurate. 
An Analysis of the Objection and Reply 
 Hawthorne’s reply has a litany of issues. The first of which is that it the gas gauge is simply a device 
that may or may not indicate the correct amount of fuel. A gas gauge can work without issue for 10 years. 
However, let’s say the driver of the car hit a pothole with enough force that it caused the gas gauge the flail 
wildly, and giving out a different random measurement of gas every time the driver looks at it. Does this 
change the amount of fuel in the tank? It does not. What if we reverse the components of Hawthorne’s 
argument? The driver checks the fuel tank daily to see if it is indeed full. The gas gauge reflects this. It is full 
for 364 days. On the 365
th
 day, the tank is empty but the gas gauge still shows that it is full. Does this change 
the evidence? It does not, we have evidence that the gas gauge has issues and not the gas tank. Hawthorne’s 
argument seems to be based on the probability of the gas gauge being accurate, rather than genuine 
evidence of the gas tank not being full. Hawthorne’s objection relies on gathering minimal evidence which 
allows Williamson to effectively reply and disarm the objection. If knowledge is based on evidence, then we 
cannot restrict ourselves to evidence based on probability, the evidence must  be shown to be evidence or 
non-evidence. 
 
 Williamson’s reply also has issues because it too relies on probability. The focus on epistemic 
possibility is simply a spiced-up version of probability: that knowledge received from evidence may be true. 
This seems to go against Williamson’s earlier argument where he claims that evidence should be looked at 
in a scientific manner. In science, evidence either exists or it does not exist. Fresh water boils at 100 degrees 
Celsius. This can be tested and falsified through a minor modification such as changing the altitude or 
composition of the water. When this is tested we will have a different batch of evidence to account for the 
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change in the circumstances. Williamson’s reply does not make room for this because it relies on the 
probability of something being true rather than it being definitely true or non-true. 
Evidence-First Contextualism 
 We can know if the gas gauge is accurate or inaccurate in our car without being subjected to cruel 
Hawthornean restriction on obtaining evidence: we are free to use other means or simply experience to 
determine if it is true or not. We are even free to debate on what “full” means. Is it full when the gas gauge 
need is perfectly aligned with the “F”? Is the gas tank full when you overfill the tank, with any excess gas 
draining?  
 Perhaps the greatest argument for evidence-first contextualism is that you test the boundaries of 
evidence daily. Regardless of justified true belief or any of its 4
th
 condition modifiers, you prove to yourself 
that you have knowledge of various types in different settings based on evidence. You have evidence that 
olive oil is great for cooking with at low cooking temperatures as much as you know that it burns when your 
pan is too hot. You do not need to create a system for knowledge—it naturally occurs through these daily 
encounters with evidence. 
 Evidence-first contextualism makes room for a universe of complex possibilities. By its nature it is 
malleable, it is not a school of thought with hard-defined versions of knowledge, belief, truth, and so on. It is 
like a sandbox: in this particular set of circumstances, the evidence creates a field of knowledge. In a 
differing set of circumstances, the evidence will lead to a different form of knowledge. We know that in 
space, there is vacuum with no oxygen, no sound, and now air resistance. Things that occur in space are 
completely silent. However, when we enter the sandbox of Star Wars, loud sounds, fiery explosions, and 
aerial maneuvers are possible in the Star Wars universe. Knowledge within evidence-contextualism 
functions in the same way. We have evidence that the space in Star Wars is quite different from the space in 
photographs from the Hubble telescope. Our possible knowledge is limited only by the available evidence.  
(1) Evidence is the basis for knowledge 
(2) You define the context, or sandbox, where your evidence is true 
(3) Your evidence establishes knowledge in that context 
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An evidence-first contextualism avoids the problems of skepticism by creating a system of 
knowledge based on evidence. This evidence is not permanent or universal, but specific to its 
circumstances. This allows us to avoid Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology to justify belief as well as 
Hawthorne’s prohibition on evidence gathering. As Leonard Shelby states in Memento: “Memories can be 
distorted. They're just an interpretation, they're not a record, and they're irrelevant if you have the facts.” 
The concept of knowledge is as hazy as memories, and evidence within a specific context is our best attempt 
at creating knowledge. 
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